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LEGALIZING JERUSALEM OR, OF LAW,
FANTASY, AND FAITH*
Nathaniel Berman**

Good afternoon. Ten days before this conference, the Israeli newspaper Ha-Aretz published an article on the history of proposals to internationalize Jerusalem. The article was entitled, "The History of a Fantasy." 1
There would seem to be no more fitting title for a discussion of the relationship of nationalist conflict and international law-particularly when
the conflict concerns a place as heavily laden with political, religious, cultural, and legal fantasies as Jerusalem. Full sovereignty over the city is
the ultimate nationalist fantasy; internationalization is the ultimate internationalist fantasy; spiritual, other-worldly guardianship is the ultimate
religious fantasy. The challenge for international law in responding to
nationalism is not the bypassing of such fantasies for "reality": for in dealing with nationalism, competing fantasies are at the heart of the matter.
The question is whether there is a legal response to this kind of conflict
that can embrace the competing fantasies of the nationalist and religious
adversaries; only such a response, a "fantastic" response, will be able to
provide a "realistic" framework for peace.
It's hard not to talk about fantasies when you are talking about Jerusalem. Millions of people have been dreaming and scheming about the City
for millennia. The conquerors-Israelite, Muslim, Crusader, Ottoman,
British, to name a few-all had an image of the city as it should be, all
had plans for its path to its ideal form. Readings and re-readings of the
meaning of Jerusalem have marked human history for a very long time.
The very architecture of the city, as we learned from this morning's talks,
materially embodies the layering of fantasies upon earlier fantasies, the
competition of fantasies with each other, the echoing of one fantasy by
* Adapted from a speech given at a symposium entitled, "Jerusalem: Dimensions of
a Unique City," held in conjunction with the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies at the
Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America on October 24, 1995.
** Professor of Law, Northeastern University. I would like to thank Marie-Claire
Belleau, Aeyal Gross, Outi Korhonen, and Deena Zeigen for their comments on earlier
drafts.
1. Dalya Karpel. Toldoteha shel Fantasia,HA-ARETZ, Musaf section, Oct. 13, 1995, at
18. (Translations are mine unless otherwise noted).
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another. As an international lawyer, I would like to focus on international legal fantasies, while keeping these other dreams in mind.
The ultimate international legal fantasy, as I've said, is the fantasy of
internationalization.2 This idea was incorporated in the United Nations
Partition Resolution 1813 of November 29, 1947. Jerusalem was to be a
corpus separatum under the administration of the United Nations Trusteeship Council. 4 The Trusteeship Council produced a detailed draft constitution for the corpus separatum.5 In fact, Abba Eban, the Israeli
diplomat, has recently reported that the discussions in the Trusteeship
Council went so far as to include debate over the kind of television appropriate for the corpus separatum: a municipal television or an internationalized television.6 According to Eban: "As the Trusteeship Council
went deeper into the matter, its illusionary character became ever clearer.
It is impossible to take a country away from its population. '' 7 This statement encapsulates the issue for those skeptical of internationalization: it
opposes the internationalist "illusion" to the "population" who presumably enibody "reality." This opposition would seem to severely limit the
possibility of internationalist restrictions on sovereignty. And yet Eban
himself, a well-known moderate on peace issues, advocates the granting
of diplomatic status to the holy places, even to the extent of accepting the
flying of a "Muslim or Palestinian" flag over such places in the Old City,
"on the model of the Vatican": "I do not think that Italy suffers from the
fact that there is some small sovereignty in the middle of Rome." 8 Even
this modest proposal, however, partakes of the basic structure of the international legal fantasy of how to respond to nationalist conflicts, a
structure we need to examine more closely.
Although many observers talk about the attenuation of sovereignty as
a distinctively late twentieth-century phenomenon, it has long been a feature of the international imagination, both legal and otherwise, particularly in relation to nationalist conflicts. For close to two centuries,
international law has developed a framework of responses to nationalist
2. See generally, M IR YDIT, INTERNATIONALIZED TERRITORIES: FROM THE "FREE
CITY OF CRACOW" TO THE "FREE CITY OF BERLIN" (1961). With specific reference to the
interwar period, see Nathaniel Berman, "But the Alternative is Despair":EuropeanNationalism and the Modernist Renewal of InternationalLaw, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1792, 1874-98
(1993).
3. See G.A. Res. 181(11), U.N. GAOR, 2nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/64, at 131 (1947).
4. See generally, YDIT, supra note 2, at 273-314 (discussing Jerusalem's history and
detailing the United Nations' plans to internationalize under the corpus separatum).
5. U.N. Doc. T/118 Rev. 2 (April 21, 1948); see Ydit, supra note 2, at 285.
6. Interview with Abba Eban, HA-ARETZ, Musaf Section, Oct. 10, 1995, at 24.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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conflict based on the attenuation of sovereign rights, the heightening of
international legal authority, and measures to ensure the simultaneous
expression and containment of nationalist passion. This basic idea has
taken many legal forms: most notably, self-determination, plebiscites, international minority protection, individual human rights, and various
forms of internationalization, including mandates, trusteeships, supranational legal integration, and direct international governance. After World
War I, these kinds of solutions were proposed on an unprecedented (and
unequalled) scale for very large parts of the globe, the territories that had
belonged to empires that had been defeated or had collapsed during the
war. In central and eastern Europe, the international community recognized the creation of many national states, subjected some disputed areas
to plebiscite, and instituted international protections for national minorities. In addition, the Versailles settlement subjected three European regions to various forms of internationalization: the Saar, Danzig, and
Upper Silesia. In Africa and Asia, the territories of the defeated German
and Ottoman Empires, including Palestine, were given to Britain and
France as League of Nations Mandates, to be governed as a "sacred trust
of civilization." 9
In 1947, when Britain decided to relinquish the mandate over Palestine, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution f8i providing for the partition of the territory and the internationalization of
Jerusalem. This resolution was itself a masterpiece of the international
legal imagination, embodying the entire range of international legal solutions for the problem of nationalism. Most importantly, it provided: selfdetermination, in its call for two states, one Arab, one Jewish; minority
protection guarantees for the Jewish and Arab minorities in the new
states; supranationalintegration in the form of an "Economic Union of
Palestine," overseen by a Joint Economic Board with Arab, Jewish, and
United Nations representatives; and, finally, internationalizationfor Jerusalem under the Trusteeship Council, subject to plebiscitary review by the
City's residents after ten years. The entire plan was to be safeguarded by
the Security Council. Far from an aberrational whimsy, this resolution
both followed in a long tradition and has remained a model for international legal plans for nationalist conflicts. One can draw a direct chain of
influence and evolution from the 1878 Treaty of Berlin for the settlement
of nationalist conflicts in the Balkans, to the 1923 Geneva Convention for
Upper Silesia for the settlement of a German-Polish territorial dispute, to

9. See League of Nations Covenant, Versailles Treaty, art. 22, 225 C.T.S. 188, 203
(1919).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 45:823

the 1947 Palestine Partition Resolution, to the 1995 Dayton Agreement
on Bosnia.
The idea of internationalization participates in two other characteristic
international fantasies: the universality and rationality of international
authority. Although universality and rationality seem like clear and unitary notions, each in fact has served as the terrain of struggle between
competing substantive ideas. The contentiousness of the universality of
the internationalization idea emerges immediately when we think about
its modern legal version in relation to some earlier versions. The ideology of the Crusades, for example, was a form of the aspiration to internationalize Jerusalem: to take the authority over Jerusalem away from
unworthy local inhabitants in order to transfer it to representatives of a
religion with universal pretensions. The notion of the superiority of international supervision, particularly in relation to tensions among different
religious groups, was embodied in Ottoman times in the so-called "Capitulations"-provisions the Christian powers imposed giving them the right
to protect Christian communities in the City.'" This spirit can also be
found in the desire of several states in the 1947 United Nations Special
Committee on Palestine to ensure that Jerusalem would remain under the
control of a preferably Christian, but at any rate non-Jewish and nonMuslim, institution." In other words, the very impulse towards internationalization in 1947 was a distant echo, a legal transmutation, of earlier
ideas of internationalization whose universality was highly debatable.
The point is not that there can never be persuasive arguments for the
value of internationalization. Rather, it is that internationalization may
take many forms; the "universality" of any particular form, its claim to
stand above the partisan fray, must be justified in substantive terms.
Partisans in the Arab-Jewish conflict in the past century have offered
differing interpretations of internationalization. In the early twentieth
century, some Zionist writers saw the international legal idea of the attenuation of sovereignty as the key to implementing their plans for Palestine. In the 1920s, for example, Moshe Glickson argued that the Palestine
mandate had to be interpreted in light of the fundamental change in international relations brought about by the establishment of the League of
Nations. 12 In this new system, sovereignty would be limited in the interest of securing justice for all peoples. Thus, Glickson argued that the
legal solution appropriate for resolving the clash of nationalisms in Pales10. See generally, G. PI-LISSIt DU RAUSAS, II LE RIGIME DES CAPITULATIONS DANS
L'EMPIRE O-IrOMAN 80-175 (1905).
11. MOTI GOLANI, TSIYON BE-TsIYONUT 43 (1992); YDrr, supra note 2, at 304.
12. YOSEF GORNI, HA-SHE'AILAH HA-ARAVIT VE HA-BA'AYAH HA-YEHUDIT 13637 (1985).
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tine did not lie in a single state "sovereignty," but in two national "autonomies"; prefiguring the Dayton Agreement, Glickson envisioned these
two autonomous entities as united by a "free covenant between peoples"
who accord each other "legal personality."' 3 Another writer saw the
mandate's provisions for a Jewish National Home as an international
form of eminent domain, in which a territory could be appropriated by
the international community to serve a pressing public need. 4 With regard to Jerusalem, a feature of mainstream Zionist thinking from the beginning was that the problem of the Old City and the Holy Places should
be separated from the question of sovereignty in Palestine as a whole.
Thus, Herzl thought that, the Old City should be internationalized; Jewish
sovereignty could then prevail outside the walls where he anticipated the
establishment of a modern, secular city. 5
Such ideas show how the seemingly neutral form of internationalization can serve partisan substantive positions. Edward Said, for example, is
well-known for asserting that Zionists have always based their case on the
"denial of present reality in Palestine with some argument about a
'higher' interest, cause or mission."' 6 For Said, this phenomenon explains
7
why "all appeals for Zionism were international appeals perforce."'
Said's tendentious opposition between "reality" and a "superior idea"'" is
structured in the same way as that found in the quote from Eban cited
above. This similarity in structure between the arguments of rival political positions highlights the difficulty of such claims, insofar as they seek
to base a normative argument on the intrinsic superiority of "reality" to
"idea." Said's argument is a normative claim, a claim that some group of
people has been wronged and deserves redress-redress that will necessarily involve the undoing of a present "reality" judged as illegitimate.
Since 1948, Palestinian partisans have sought the support of international
moral opinion against a claimed illegitimate "reality" just as the Zionists
sought such support in an earlier era. An abstract opposition between
local "reality" and international "illusion" or "idea" just will not do when
the argument is taking place on the normative plane.
Indeed, Said himself has recently criticized the Oslo agreements on the
eminently internationalist grounds that Palestine should be restored "to
its place not simply as a small piece of territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River but as an idea that for years galvanized
13. Id.
14. Abraham Weinfeld, Eminent Domain Among Peoples, 21 TEMPLE L.Q. 223 (1948).

15.
16.

GOLANI, supra note 11, at 11.
EDWARD W. SAID, THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE

17. Id. at 22.
18. Id. at 18.

15 (1979).
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the Arab world into thinking about and fighting for social justice, democracy, and a different kind of future."' 9 It is thus not a question of choosing between "internationalist illusion" and "local reality," but between
competing normative visions that seek to have both international and local appeal. One can either summarize this point by saying that the international idea is not universal, or that there are competing forms of
"universality" and that the key question is the kind of substantive vision
being propounded.
It is no accident that both representatives of the Israeli right, like Elyakim Haetzni, and of the Palestinian left, like Edward Said, have repeatedly compared the participants in the Oslo peace process to the
collaborationist government of Vichy France. 2° The ideology of collaboration during World War II was that the Germans were creating a new
universal legal order in which each of the peoples of Europe could find its
place. The critique of collaboration, of course, was that the new order was
merely a vehicle for German oppression. When Haetzni and Said compare P6tain to Rabin and Arafat, respectively, they are seeking to delegitimize the universal pretensions of the version of international law
represented by the Oslo process. Supporters of the peace process consider such comparisons more than obscenely hyperbolic: they consider
them based on a fundamental failure to see the possibility offered by the
peace process of an alliance of internationalism with both competing
nationalisms.
Just as there are various forms or conceptions of the universality of
international authority, so are there competing conceptions of its rationality. I want to focus on three attitudes, three different forms of reason,
that characterize international lawyers and policymakers dealing with nationalism. I call these attitudes the formalist, the pragmatic, and the cultural. 2 1 Although they may be portrayed as three systematic approaches,
it is probably more accurate to say that they are three aspirations shared
by most who concern themselves with international law. I want to examine these approaches specifically as they relate to the international
lawyer or policymaker engaged in proposing an international legal solution for Jerusalem. Each of these approaches may be correlated with a
19. EDWARD W. SAID, PEACE AND ITS DiscoNTENTs: ESSAYS ON PALESTINE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS XXXiii (1995).
20. See, e.g., interviews with Haetzni in HA-ARETZ, Nov. 17, 1995, at 15 [International
Edition], and with Said in THE NATION, Nov. 7, 1994, at 520.
21. For an analysis of predecessors of today's formalist and pragmatists, see Hans J.
Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 260
(1940). For an introduction to cultural analysis, see Nathaniel Berman, Modernism, Nationalism, and the Rhetoric of Reconstruction, 4 YALE J. L. & HUM. 351 (1992).
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certain kind of fantasy of the relationship between international law and
nationalism.
Formalism is an approach rarely found in its pure form today, but
which no international lawyer ever really fully abandons. In relation to
Jerusalem, formalism would seek to determine the various entities and
groups who should be viewed as right-holders and to specify their rights.
There might be several kinds of right-holders in Jerusalem: states who
might have sovereign rights, peoples who might have a right to national
self determination, minorities who might have a right to minority protection, persons who might have individual human rights, international organizations who might have a right of supervision of the other rights.
Now what is the formalist's fantasy life? You might imagine that the
fantasy life of a formalist is very limited, but that's not true. The fantasy
of a formalist is that the identification of the rights-holders and the determination of their rights will ease nationalist conflicts. She thinks this link
possible because of the way she imagines the parties to such a conflict,
international law, and their interrelationship. She imagines the nationalist protagonists to be essentially secular, legal claimants: people who believe in rights that can be weighed and balanced against other rights by a
human authority whose judgments should be accepted in the name of
this-worldly peace and order. She imagines international law as primarily
engaged in rights adjudication. She imagines their interrelationship as
the pacification of conflict through the acceptance by the parties of the
legal disposition established by the cognitive and normative authority of
international law.
The problem, of course, in Jerusalem is that many of the claimants are
not secular, legal claimants. Claims are often not articulated in the language of relative human law but in the name of absolute national rights
or divine law-the kind of claims that cannot be adjudicated so easily, at
least in the modem rights-balancing form of adjudication. The formalist
cannot incorporate in her vision of international law the extravagant, passionate, fantasy life of the nationalist claimants; nor can she engage in
self-reflection about the fantasy-quality of her own vision of the role of
international law in such conflicts. The formalist's fantasy is founded on
her exclusion of fantasy from her image of the world. And yet, as I
noted, no international lawyer ever really divests herself of formalism: we
all seek consensually based normative criteria, conceptual distinctions,
rigorous analysis.
The second attitude, which is the overwhelmingly predominant attitude
in modem international law, is the pragmatic attitude. The pragmatist is
not so interested in the conceptual or strict juridical implications of terms
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like sovereignty, nationhood, or minority status, let alone the "indivisible
rights of sovereignty" or "absolute rights to self-determination." The
pragmatist is concerned with the reasonable interests of the parties and
how a legal framework could be constructed to satisfy as many of those
interests as possible. Often, in relation to Jerusalem, pragmatism takes
the form of functionalist analysis: what are the governmental functions
that need to be accomplished in the city and how can these functions be
parcelled out so as to minimize conflict? Such functions can run from
mail delivery to administration of the holy places. The pragmatist who
leans to a functionalist solution does not flinch from parcelling out socalled sovereign rights, transforming self-determination into governance
tasks, and limiting minority rights to reasonable accommodation of
differences.
The fantasy of the pragmatist about the nationalist protagonists is that
they are rational maximizers of reasonable interests. She imagines international law and policy as a manager of those rational interests, either
through balancing or functional parcellization. She imagines pacification
will emerge as the nationalist adversaries come to see their stake in the
interest-maximizing legal framework. The problem with the pragmatist is
quite similar to that of the formalist: in Jerusalem, as anyone who has
actually been there can attest, many of the protagonists are not rational
maximizers of reasonable interests. It is not that they are all violent
fanatics, but that their passions, their fears, their fantasies exceed both
formal rights and reasonable interests. And yet, the pragmatic approach
is indispensable: we all seek to provide a workable solution, freed from
conceptual absolutes.
The third attitude, which I call the cultural approach, places its central
emphasis on the extravagant, fantastic passions of nationalist claimants
and international authorities.22 The cultural approach is interested in the
passionate absolutism of the nationalist imagination, in nationalists' fierce
attachment to that which rationalists see as "merely" symbolic. The cultural approach also explores the way international lawyers and policymakers construct their images of the nationalist protagonists in
22. I am using the "cultural approach" here as shorthand for an approach able to take
into account the extravagance of the passions involved in nationalist conflicts, rather than
in any conventional anthropological sense. What I have in mind is suggested in the following quote from an influential cultural critic:
Human life, distinct from its legal existence ... cannot be limited to the closed
systems which reasonable conceptions assign to it.... [T]hat which it accepts of
order and reserve only has meaning from the moment when the ordered and reserved forces free and abandon themselves for goals which cannot be
subordinated to anything calculable.
GEORGES BATAILLE, LA PART MAUDITE

43 (1967).
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accordance with their own implicit, culturally and historically contingent,
fears and fantasies. It focuses on the passionate extravagance that underlies the assertion of seemingly formal distinctions and pragmatic
exigencies.
The mandate system which played such an important role in the modem history of Jerusalem provides the most obvious and notorious example of the cultural passion underlying seemingly formal distinctions and
pragmatic proposals. The mandate system was designed, in the words of
the League of Nations Covenant, "for peoples not yet ready to stand up
under the strenuous conditions of the modern world"; the level of supervision that mandatory powers would have over the territories under their
supervision would depend on their "stage of development," including
their "remoteness from the centres of civilization." 23 International
policymakers defended this distinction on both formal and pragmatic
grounds.2 4 While the ideas underlying the Mandate system seem obviously culturally "biased" to most people today, international law and policy continues to project culturally contingent images onto the
protagonists of nationalist conflicts. The cultural approach would argue
that the issue is not "bias" but competing passionate investments in rival
cultural visions; the goal is not to divest oneself of "bias" but to commit
oneself to a worthy passion. Such passionate projection is unavoidable:
one should not seek to get rid of cultural images but to make them explicit, evaluate them substantively, allow them to compete for our passion
with alternative images.
Conversely, the way nationalist groups imagine themselves often depends on their passionate investment in international legal categories.
The Middle East conflict is an excellent example of this phenomenon.
Who are the rival claimants in the Holy Land? Are they members of
different religions ("Jews," "Muslims," and "Christians")? Are they two
trans-border peoples ("Jews" and "Arabs")? Are they two territorially
defined nations ("Israelis" and "Palestinians")? Are they individuals
with claims to equality and nondiscrimination? The answers cannot be
given without taking into account the fact that the historically shifting
ways nationalists have imagined themselves have been partly a response
to the way they have been imagined internationally. At different historical periods, nationalists have internalized, resisted, adopted, or denied
various international characterizations of their identity because of those
23. League of Nations Covenant, Versailles Treaty Act, art. 22, 225 C.T.S. 188, 203
(1919).

24. See, e.g., Jan Smuts, The League of Nations: A Practical Proposal, in
HUNTER MILLER,

II

THE DRAFTnNG OF THE COVENANT

23, 28 (1928).

DAVID
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characterizations' cultural meanings, legal implications, and/or tactical
consequences.
My view is that the cultural approach is the perspective most appropriate for evaluating the international legal role in nationalist conflicts, for
understanding the passionate fantasy life of international lawyers and
policymakers, as well as of the nationalist protagonists. One might imagine that if the emphasis on extravagant passion is the most accurate way
of looking at the relationship between international law and nationalist
conflicts, then the situation is hopeless.25 How can we induce passionate,
extravagant nationalists to reconcile with each other when the international policymakers trying to bring about the reconciliation are themselves passionate, extravagant fantasizers? Nevertheless, my claim is that
the cultural approach can redeem both the formalists' insight that the
normative claims of the parties must be taken seriously and the
pragmatists' insight that these often irreconcilable claims must be moderated in the name of a workable framework for peace.
The cultural approach can redeem both of these insights by insisting
that the international legal framework make room for fantasy in its very
structure. Fantasy cannot be excluded as that which is simply an obstacle
to formal legalism or pragmatism: such an approach simply dooms any
effort to failure. In contrast, the insistence on incorporating competing
fantasies into the legal framework is embodied in a proposal for Jerusalem formulated by one of my co-panelists, Ambassador Adnan Abu
Odeh. I would like to interpret this plan as an exemplification of the cultural approach. As he outlined to you today, Ambassador Abu Odeh has
called for a complex three-part regime for Jerusalem, symbolized by the
three most widely-used names for the City: Jerusalem, al-Quds, and
Yerushalaim. Under his plan, the east part of Jerusalem, under the name
of al-Quds, would be under Palestinian control and the west, under the
name of Yerushalaim, under Israeli control. The walled city, the Old,
Holy City, would be called Jerusalem, and its disposition would be left to
the imagination on several levels.
Over the walled city of Jerusalem, however, no flags would
fly, for the sacred shrines would be the symbol of the city's Godgiven holiness and spiritual significance to all believers in one
God, belonging not to this state or that. The holy walled city of
Jerusalem would be open to all; Muslims, Christians and Jews
must not be separated from their holy shrines, from which they
25. For example, after an in-depth study of internationalization experiments, one com-

mentator concluded that failure was inevitable due "to the clash between 'internationalization' and the irrational forces of growing contemporary Nationalism." YDIT, supra note 2,
at 321.
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all derive their cultural and religious identities. It would be governed by a council representing the highest Muslim, Christian,
and Jewish religious authorities .... Administrative details of
the spiritual city of Jerusalem would be left to creative minds in
negotiations.2 6
Thus far, the Ambassador's plan for sovereignty plus internationalization (or, rather, de-sovereign-ization) may sound like a combination of
formalism and pragmatic functionalism. But the key part of the plan for
the cultural approach is embodied in the following passage:
[I]n the Arab mind, Muslim and Christians alike, al-Quds
would extend as far as their own holy sites in the walled city.
Yerushalaim, to the Jewish mind, would stretch as far as their
holy sites inside the city.... Thus Jews and Arabs (Muslims and
Christians) alike would not lose the city so holy to them; the
Arabs would not lose al-Quds, the Jews would keep
Yerushalaim as the undivided capital of Israel and the world
would be assured that Jerusalem was not being assimilated into
either.... In this framework the issue of Jerusalem would be
resolved not only as a symbol of peace but also as an embodiment of its essence. 27
A brilliant passage. Without necessarily adopting all of its details, I think
this is the most advanced kind of thinking about internationalism's relationship to nationalism: the explicit provision of a place for fantasy within
the details of a complex legal/administrative plan for a disputed territory.
I would interpret the "essence" of Jerusalem, which the Ambassador says
is beyond that of a "symbol of peace," as the place of fantasy, of extravagance, of passion.
Thus, what Ambassador Abu Odeh's proposal does is offer a plausibly
workable ("pragmatic") solution based on rigorous ("formal") distinctions which is yet able to embrace the fantasy ("cultural") life of the protagonists. In effect, the plan says: "You Zionists and religious Jews, you
want to imagine that your sovereignty goes as far as your Holy Places and
national monuments, go ahead. You Palestinian nationalists and religious
Muslims and Christians, you want to imagine that your sovereignty goes
as far as your religious and national shrines, fine; you internationalists,
you want to imagine that none of these local protagonists will dominate
this universally revered place, relax; I happen to have a cosmopolitan solution which will enable you all to indulge your fantasy lives." The bril26. Adnan Abu Odeh, Two Capitals in an Undivided Jerusalem, 71 FOREIGN AFFs.,
Spring 1992, at 183, 187.
27. Id. at 188.
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liance of this proposal lies in its provision of an explicit place for the
psychology of nationalism and internationalism within its very structure.
This plan thus embraces the fantasy life of the nationalist protagonists
as well as that of the international policy proposer. The international
policymaker must come to understand that the congruence between sophisticated internationalism and nationalist desire is ultimately a form of
faith. This faith is different than that of a rational legalism or an interestbalancing pragmatism. It's a faith in the conjunction between a dream of
pacific internationalism and a passion for nationalist identity and loyalty.
It's a paradox, like all forms of faith.
This paradox is particularly striking when the policy proposer is both a
passionate internationalist and a passionate nationalist, like the Ambassador, like myself. While international lawyers often speak of a "ddoublement fonctionnel" to capture the relationship between a person's
international and national roles,2" I would prefer to speak of a "dkdoublement passionnel" of their internationalist and nationalist longings. The
fantasy of such a policy proposer "d6doublg" is that there is a way we can
be both believers in cosmopolitan peace and yet remain who we are: passionate, partisan nationalists. I view Ambassador Abu Odeh's proposal
as an expression of this most advanced kind of internationalist faith. In
the plan's deliberate interpretive looseness, its willingness to allow itself
to be defined differently by the different protagonists in the conflict, it
shows its embrace of competing fantasies. In rejecting narrow formalist
rigor or technocratic pragmatic precision in favor of a passionate internationalist faith, it is paradoxically the most "realistic" of approaches.
It is a paradoxical faith that has been nurtured for almost two centuries
by a small group of believers, in the shadow of cynical diplomatic
maneuverings. The struggle of this insistent tradition of internationalist
fantasy against the faithless may be tracked through the fierce interpretive debates about legal milestones from the Treaty of Berlin to the Versailles Treaty, from the Palestine Partition Resolution to the Oslo and
Dayton agreements. Stigmatized in bygone times as "idealist" and today
as "post-modernist," the faith-dimension of this form of internationalism
is not an unfortunate, irrational residue that needs to be gotten rid of.
Rather, an element of fantasy, of faith, is an irreducible element of any
international legal approach to nationalism. I propose to you this faith,
this fantasy, as a precondition for international legal work on the problem
of Jerusalem. I can't prove either its logical impeccability or the
probability of its pragmatic success. I can only ask you, along with Am28. See Georges Scelle, Les Regles Generales De La Paix, 46 RCADI 331, 358-59
(1933-IV).
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bassador Abu Odeh and other heroes of the peace process, to have the
conversion experience that will enable you to join us in this faith.

1996)
In the months following the conference at which this talk was delivered, the political, humanitarian, and ideological atmosphere in the Middle East has sustained a set of severe traumas: the assassination of
Yitzhak Rabin, the suicide bombings in Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv, the sealing-off of the West Bank and Gaza. As a result of these events, the faith
proposed in this talk may appear as an artifact of a simpler, more naive,
phase of the peace process, now lost forever. The assassination and
bombings were the work of those who offer a form of faith alternative to
that proposed in this talk. Their faith permits only an undivided, monomaniacal passion, in which neither engagement nor compromise with
other passions is possible. I urge those who continue to believe in peace
neither to give in to the faith of the assassins and bombers, nor to seek
refuge in a sterile rationalism which is doomed to abstractly condemn
what it cannot understand. Only those who have felt the passion of nationalism can understand and struggle with the conflict; only those whose
passions are divided between nationalism and other commitments, like
internationalism and the longing for engagement with other peoples, can
truly participate in the ongoing struggle for peace.
EPILOGUE (MARCH,

